The monthly inspections, which began in April 2010 following the explosion at the Upper Big Branch Mine, involved mines that merited increased agency attention and enforcement due to their poor compliance history or particular compliance concerns.
These matters include high numbers of violations or closure orders; frequent hazard complaints or hotline calls; plan compliance issues; inadequate workplace examinations; a high number of accidents, injuries or illnesses; fatalities; adverse conditions such as increased methane liberation, faulty roof conditions and inadequate ventilation; and respirable dust.
During the program, the US Mine Safety and Health Administration conducted an inspection at TRC Mining Corp. #2 mine in Kentucky’s Letcher County on November 27. Enforcement personnel issued 23 citations and seven orders, including five unwarrantable failure orders and two failure-to-abate orders for previously issued citations. The orders closed the entire underground portion of the mine.
Subsequent to this inspection, the mine operator changed the mine status to non-producing, with four miners working one shift per day. The operator also submitted a plan to remove equipment from the mine on December 7 and to have the removal completed by January 1, 2013. This was the third impact inspection at this mine.
Five unwarrantable failure orders were issued for failure to follow the approved ventilation plan, failure to properly maintain and repair mine seals, and failure to conduct adequate pre-shift examinations.
The operator’s approved ventilation plan on the mechanized mining unit stipulates the installation of a line curtain within 14 feet of each working face with a minimum air quantity in all 10 entries.
Mining was underway when inspectors arrived to find either no line curtain where required or line curtains in excess of the required 14 feet; at one point a line curtain was installed 35 feet from the face.
No air movement could be detected behind the curtains in four entries, and they did not extend into the last open cross-cut to maintain the necessary minimum air quantity. TRC also did not properly maintain the water spray system – provided for the belt drive transfer point – in an operable condition.
At the time of the inspection, coal was running on the belt line at this location. The water supply had been turned off at the cutoff valve (where the branch line connects to the main water line).
The mine was also cited for violations of annual retraining requirements, inadequate roof support, no warning devices at the end of permanent roof support, blocked personnel doors along each side of the #1 beltline, pre-shift examinations not recorded, failure to maintain the primary intake escape way, accumulations of combustible material in areas of the mine, and improperly maintained mining and electrical equipment and fire suppression systems.
“We continue to identify operators who have not gotten the message,” MSHA assistant secretary Joseph Main said.
“Exposure to harmful levels of respirable dust is unacceptable. Not conducting adequate examinations is unacceptable.
“Miners deserve better.”
Last week, MSHA issued an advisory in the wake of the fatal bulldozer and slurry pit accident at Consol Energy’s Robinson Run mine in West Virginia.
In order to prevent similar incidents where equipment slides into a pool area, MSHA released its initial findings and suggested best practices such as hazard training to all workers near an impoundment. These should detail recognition of hazards relating to the impoundment and pushout work, such as surface cracks or bubbling in the water/slurry.
The organization also urged the review of safety precautions for upstream construction with all equipment operators, along with material-handling safety policies and designated storage areas for safety equipment.
The Robinson Run slurry-bulldozer accident marked the 19th death in US coal this year and was the first to be classified under MSHA’s “other” category.