Outby foreman Farley Sargent, 33, died the morning of June 25 at McCoy Elkhorn’s Mine No. 23 in Pikeville. A section of the mine rib measuring 26.5 feet long, 52.5 inches wide and 17 inches thick fell on top of him.

Farley had been laying track, about 63 feet outby survey station No. 6080 in the No. 5 track/belt entry, and was installing a timber for rib support when the accident occurred.

He was pronounced dead about two hours after the fall ncident at 1.30pm at the Pikeville Medical Center.

An examination of the mine’s rib conditions indicated sloughage had resulted from stress created by a narrow remnant barrier and small centers of an underlying mine.

“The mine roof was in a transition zone beginning in the crosscut outby the accident scene,” investigators noted.

“The shale roof changed to laminated sandstone about four feet above the coal seam. The operator mined the shale up to the sandstone to increase the mining height because the shale would try to separate and fall from the sandstone when a thin layer of shale was left intact.”

A review of the scene found damp and muddy conditions.

MSHA also reviewed preshift examinations records in its probe, specifically those conducted on and before June 25 2012, in the belt/track and travelways outby the MMU region and found them to be inadequate.

“During these examinations, examiners did not identify any specific hazardous rib or roof conditions … [and] no corrective actions for rib and roof conditions were recorded,” the agency said.

“The operator initially complied with the roof control plan, but failed to install additional supports or take the ribs down when the rib sloughage increased.”

In lieu of rib bolts, the mine used timbers for rib support, and crews had followed their procedure to remedy the sloughage of the ribs in the area of the incident.

While the timbers were sufficient at the time of installation, MSHA said, the ribs subsequently deteriorated to the point where the timbers installed would not adequately support the ribs, a condition that was not recognized by the examiner.

“This fatal accident occurred because the operator failed to follow the approved roof control plan and adequately support or control the ribs to protect the miners from adverse rib conditions where persons work or travel,” federal investigators concluded.

“Additionally, the operator failed to conduct an adequate pre-shift examination by failing to recognize that timbers were not adequate to safely control the ribs after the ribs had deteriorated.”

To rectify the root cause issues that it said contributed to the miner’s death, MSHA ordered the installation of rib supports to adequately control the ribs and protect persons from the hazards of falling material in the accident and adjacent areas.

In addition, the mine’s roof control plan was revised to require specific measures to be taken when mining within 150 feet before, during, and 150 feet after crossing barriers. That new plan requires 80ft entry centers, 90ft crosscut centers, 18ft entry and crosscut widths, 20ft maximum cut depth, separate track and belt entries, and the installation of rib angle brackets four feet apart with a bracket to install lashing (nylon strap rated at 22,000 pounds breaking strength) on every other support.

“Support brackets will extend four feet down the block,” investigators said of the work that has now been completed.

“Belt and track will be installed in the middle of the entries. Six inch by six inch timbers will be installed within 24 hours of the belt being moved up, two feet off each rib between the angle supports.”

Additionally, McCoy Elkhorn has trained its supervisory personnel on recognizing rib hazards, and conducting and recording a proper pre-shift examination as part of MSHA’s findings.

James River and McCoy Elkhorn were given a 104(d)(1) citation for a violation of 30 CFR 75.202(a). due to the inadequate rib support. The action was also a violation of 30 CFR 75.220(a)(1) because the used practice did not comply with provisions of the approved roof control plan.

This violation is an unwarrantable failure to comply with a mandatory standard. Standard 75.202(a) was cited 21 times in two years at the mine.

The operator also received a 104(d)(1) order for a violation of 30 CFR 75.360(b)(1) for inadequate pre-shift examinations.

McCoy Elkhorn Coal Corporation Mine No. 23 employs 114 employees and produces about 7000 tons of mined material a day.

The mine’s last regular federal safety and health inspection prior to the accident was completed on March 29 2012, and another was ongoing at the time of the incident.

Mine No. 23’s Non-Fatal Days Lost injury incidence rate in 2011 was 1.44, versus the national NFDL rate of 3.36.