April 5 will go down in US mining history as the date of the UBB mine explosion in Raleigh County, West Virginia. While the ordeal began with a half-dozen confirmed victims and nearly two dozen missing, the uncertainty ended several days later with the worst possible news – all 29 workers had perished.

"We did not receive the miracle we prayed for," then West Virginian governor Joe Manchin said as he announced the news at an early morning conference April 10.

"The journey has ended and now the healing will start."

The fourth and final rescue attempt was made April 9 after nitrogen injections and high-pressure fans helped bring explosive gas levels down.

US Mine Safety and Health Administration coal administrator Kevin Stricklin said the bodies of the men were found where searchers had expected, with three at the entrance to longwall section 22 main, and another near the headgate of the longwall itself.

The longwall worker was part of a hotseat exchange and was believed to be awaiting changeover. He was the last individual to be found by rescuers.

The location of the other three workers was about 500 feet from six killed crew members found in a mantrip just after the explosion.

None of the mine’s refuge chambers had been deployed, leading federal officials to believe the entire group was likely killed by the blast itself.

“None of the 22 miners underground had a chance to use their SCSRs,” Stricklin said.

“None of our miners suffered,” Manchin added. “They are in a better place and did not suffer in getting there.”

About 15 rescue teams, totalling about 150 crew members, were all on hand to assist with the efforts.

Since that time, there has been news nearly every day on some aspect of the UBB blast, including investigation findings, new regulations arising from the incident and a steady stream of argument between MSHA and mine owner Massey Energy on the ongoing investigations at the federal, state and internal level.

Massey chief executive Don Blankenship was scheduled to testify before state officials December 14 after being subpoenaed last month. He announced early this month that he would retire at the end of the year, and shortly after confirmed to regulators that he would plead his Fifth Amendment rights under the US Constitution and not appear to be interviewed.

Last week a US House of Representatives vote to pass the Robert C Byrd Mine Safety Protection Act, a proposal spurred in great part by UBB, was unsuccessful.

US Department of Labor secretary Hilda Solis expressed the agency’s disappointment that while the House voted 214-193 for passage, the measure was taken up as a “suspension”, meaning a two-thirds majority in agreement was required for the motion to move forward.

“I am deeply disappointed that the House of Representatives today failed to pass the [bill] under suspension of the rules,” she said.

“This commonsense legislation, championed by chairman George Miller of the Education and Labor Committee, would be an important step forward in strengthening safety laws for our nation’s miners. The measure would compel the worst of the worst in the mining industry to change how they treat their miners.”

Despite the outcome of the vote, Solis noted the results showed that a majority of the government’s members had run out of patience with operators that did not take miner health and safety seriously.

“All workers deserve to come home safe at the end of a shift. I urge every legislator to join the president and me in committing to bringing miners the safety reforms they deserve.”

Known also as the Byrd Bill and named after the late pro-coal senator from West Virginia, the proposal would have enhanced regulators’ ability to shut down problem mines and increase penalties for serious violations of health and safety laws. It also would have provided better protection to those who chose to step forward and report hazards.

While House Democrats said MSHA was in need of stronger enforcement tools, Republicans reportedly wanted to wait until the investigation into UBB was complete before progressing with a legislative solution.

"Congress cannot create new regulatory regimes without having all the information," the Associated Press quoted Representative Tim Murphy as saying.

"Instead, our legislation should be crafted with facts and evidence, not emotion. Passing this bill before we have the report is similar to letting the doctor operate on you before he has the lab results or the X-rays."

M-Class Mining MC No. 1

The nation was still reeling from the events at UBB when a contractor was killed while performing construction work at a new Illinois mine under development.

The surface worker for Coalfield Services, 61-year-old Ray Oney, was working April 11 at M-Class Mining’s MC No. 1 Sugar Camp operation in Franklin County. He was installing a set of steps from the ground level to the top of the fan house and was standing at the bottom of the steps gripping both handrails at the time of the incident.

“As a crane lifted the steps, clamps at the top holding the stairs came loose, and the top end of the steps slid down the side of the fan house, while the bottom of the steps moved backward and up, pushing the victim about 6 feet backward, crushing him between the steps and adjacent forklift,” a federal spokesperson told ILN at the time, adding that the victim walked a short distance before collapsing.

Franklin County coroner Marty Leffler said Oney, an independent contractor from North Carolina, had died from lacerations to his heart and lungs.

In late July, MSHA released an investigative report into the incident in which it cited missing policies and worker error.

“The accident occurred because employees failed to stay clear of hoisted loads,” the report said.

“In addition, a contributing factor to the accident was the method used to temporarily attach the stair stringer to the air duct. The method was not sufficient to support the weight of the stair stringer and hold it in place.”

Federal officials said the policies and controls in place at the MC No. 1 construction site did not ensure that workers would stay clear of hoisted loads.

Two citations were issued by federal investigators, one 104(a) to Coalfield Services and one 104(a) to M-Class Mining, both citing 30 CFR Section 77.210(b).

Beckley Pocahontas

Just days after the Illinois fatality, an underground continuous miner operator lost his life from injuries sustained in a pinning incident at ICG’s Beckley Pocahontas operation in southern West Virginia.

Federal and state officials confirmed for ILN at the time that a 28-year-old worker, later identified as John King, was pinned against the rib by a continuous miner the evening of April 22.

He was transported to a hospital where he underwent multiple surgeries, but both agencies later confirmed that the worker died about 11.30am April 23.

King had five years experience, two at the mine owned by International Coal Group. ICG idled the mine on April 23 in remembrance of the victim.

In mid-May, MSHA issued a series of best practices stemming from its ongoing investigation, highlighting the importance of remaining out of “red zones” underground.

The agency reminded US operations to ensure CM operators are positioned beyond the turning radius of the machine and away from the conveyor boom prior to moving equipment, and also spotlighted the need to train all production crews and management on the mine’s policies and procedures for operating remote-controlled continuous mining machines.

As it would state several more times in 2010, MSHA said proximity detection system installations could be key to preventing incidents such as the one that killed King.

The latest information on proximity detection technology can be found on MSHA’s web site.

The agency released its final investigation findings from the Beckley Pocahontas incident in late September, and pointed to a lack of red zone policies for the miner’s death.

“The accident occurred because the victim was positioned in a hazardous area while mobile equipment was in motion,” federal investigators concluded.

To correct the issue, which was found to be one of two root causes of the incident, MSHA ordered retraining for all personnel on red zone hazards relating to CMs and mobile equipment in motion.

The agency also found the operator failed to have an effective policy in place to address red zone hazards, which includes alerting management to red zone violations when they are committed or observed.

To rectify the shortfall, policies were revised and implemented; the new policy applies to both rank-and-file miners as well as mine management.

The agency ordered all staff to be retrained on CM red zones, and a meeting held on the topic was recorded and considered a written warning. From that point, any future violation would result in a three-day work suspension and a second would lead to a five-day suspension with potential discharge.

“Management may, at its discretion, accelerate this process depending on the gravity of the red zone violation,” investigators noted.

MSHA issued a 104(a) citation to Beckley Pocahontas for a violation of 30 CFR Section 75.220(a)(1).

“The mine operator failed to comply with the approved roof control plan for the 004 MMU No. 2 Section, Page 6, Item 11,” it outlined.

“The continuous miner operator was along side of the continuous mining machine … while changing places from No. 6 Left face to No. 8 Right face, resulting in the operator receiving fatal injuries.”

ICG Beckley’s room-and-pillar Pocahontas mine employs 223 workers, 208 underground, and produced an average of about 7560 tons of raw material daily at the time.

The operation’s non-fatal days lost injury incidence rate in 2009 was 8.85, versus the national NFDL rate of 3.89.

Dotiki

The final fatal incident in the quarter was the only other multiple victim incident in 2010 (as of press time), involving two Kentucky miners.

The 34th and 35th deaths occurred April 28 at Alliance Resource Partners’ Webster County Coal Dotiki operation in the western Kentucky town of Nebo. Michael Carter, 28, and Justin Travis, 27, were trapped underground following a roof collapse at the operation.

Crews traveled to the area, 500ft down and 24,000ft inby after the incident, where the men were trapped near a continuous miner. Efforts including roof stabilization and debris removal had to be halted at one point due to adverse roof conditions and resumed after the roof was stabilized.

Several days after the ultimate recovery of the victims, Alliance announced it had resumed production at Dotiki after receiving state and federal clearance to safely restart.

"Our internal investigation to date indicates that the roof fall was an unpredictable accident involving unforeseeable geological conditions," Webster County Coal executive vice-president Charlie Wesley said in May.

The company expressed condolences to the families of the victims, noting that each of its workers had felt the impact of the men’s deaths.

“This tragic accident is the only event of its kind in our 44 years of operating at Dotiki. Our lost-time injury rate for the past five years is 48 per cent below the industry average."

MSHA released its final investigation report in October, in which it cited slickenside issues and an unsupported roof for the double fatality.

The agency found hidden slickensides, or slips, in the face of the No. 3 entry of the No. 6 section and that unsupported area above the fresh cut, mined in the face of the No. 3 entry, had allowed the overlying roof weakened by the slips to break the strata’s layers.

The total fall was estimated to measure 76ft long, 19ft wide and a maximum 10ft thick, and covered both the workers and the continuous mining machine.

“The two fatalities occurred when the mine encountered an anomaly of multiple hidden intersecting slickensides … which were not detected by the mine operator,” investigators concluded.

“The most likely fall propagation mode was roof failure in the unbolted cut that had the momentum to pull down the roof in the bolted portion of the entry where the miners were working.

“The bolted portion of the entry also had non-visible or hidden slickensides in the overlying bolted strata that weakened the overlying rock beds and allowed the bolted roof to be pulled down where the miners were working.”

MSHA found that there were no signs of slips in the immediate roof, providing no warning for the need to install supplemental or additional supports.

To address the issues, Dotiki management proposed the installation of a robust support system near the last row of bolts in areas where overburden exceeded 750ft.

This would prevent roof falls that originated in the unbolted cut extending outby and which exceeded the roof support system’s capacity.

The corrective action and others developed to bolster the roof control support system were given federal approval to supplement the operator’s approved RCP.

MSHA issued a 104(a) citation to Dotiki for a violation of 30 CFR Section 75.202(a) for inadequate support.

Alliance Resource Partners responded to the investigators’ findings and said they mirrored its own, but took issue with the citation.

"The MSHA investigation confirms the factual findings of our own internal investigation – this roof fall was an unpredictable accident involving unforeseeable geological conditions," Webster County Coal operations vice-president Kenny Murray said.

Regarding the citation, he noted MSHA did not indicate at any point in its probe that the accident was preventable or that the mine or operator was negligent.

“[T]he MSHA report specifically acknowledges 'the approved roof control plan was being complied with at the time of the accident' and that 'the absence of any sign of slips in the immediate roof gave no warning for the need to install supplemental or additional support',” Murray said.

“Furthermore, in its citation MSHA specifically found that Webster County Coal was not negligent. In light of these facts, we strongly believe the citation issued today by MSHA is not justified."

At the time of the incident, the 413-worker Dotiki mine produced 26,000t daily on average from 10 mechanized mining units.

The operation’s NFDL incidence rate in 2009 was 3.68, versus the national average of 4.16.

Keep reading ILN for the next part of our review of 2010 US coal fatalities.