At first glance, 3% does not sound like much. That is, until you consider what it means in dollar terms, which in Tinkler’s case, translates to a loss on the day of $13.9 million. That is the price he paid thanks to the latest slide in the price of the company in which he is the biggest shareholder, Whitehaven Coal.
The point of linking Tinkler’s day in the witness box during a liquidator’s inquiry into the failure of one of his companies, Mulsanne Resources, with the stock market performance of Whitehaven, is that the events are effectively inseparable.
Where Whitehaven goes, so goes the future of Tinkler and all the companies that trail behind him because so much of the debt he has incurred is said to be tied to his 19.4% stake in Whitehaven.
Much of the financial side of Tinkler’s affairs is reasonably well known, though it bears repeating because the big game being played out behind the scenes of the Mulsanne inquiry is linked to the fate of Whitehaven.
According to regular reports – which have never been denied by Tinkler or his spokesmen – his group of companies is carrying debts of $700 million, with the security being his Whitehaven shares.
Last year, before the coal market caught a cold (and Tinkler got the flu) his stake in Whitehaven was worth close to $1.2 billion. That meant his net fortune was at least $500 million, which is quite an achievement for a former pit electrician.
Today, Tinkler’s 19.4% stake in Whitehaven is worth $459 million, and you don’t need a calculator to know that is considerably less than the $700 million said to have been borrowed against the shares.
Tinkler’s story at the Mulsanne inquiry before the New South Wales Supreme Court started early last year, a time when the coal price was beginning to fall, which made it impossible to complete a number of complex deals.
While his critics have been quick to condemn Tinkler for not forcing Mulsanne to pay $28.4 million for 94.7 million shares in Blackwood Coal, the reason he gave was eminently believable and could be enough for the court to rule a line under the Mulsanne investigation and for the liquidation to be finalised.
What happened, in Tinkler’s words, is that he had a number of back-to-back deals lined up that would have liberated the funds to enable Mulsanne to take up its Blackwood share placement.
The cash for the $28.4 million was supposed to come from the sale of Tinkler’s 75% stake in a royalty paid on coal mined at the Middlemount mine in Queensland.
Hong Kong-based Noble Group, a long-time supporter of Tinkler, was the buyer lined up for the royalty. But it became concerned about the inability to get its hands on the other 25% of the royalty owned by Tinkler’s one-time business partner, Matthew Higgins, and about the overall outlook for the coal market.
In simple terms, Noble walked, a totally understandable decision and one that hurt Tinkler, but about which he was not critical. It was a reflection of the fast-changing circumstances in the coal market, and Higgins’ preference to keep his share of what is a lucrative royalty in a market where the coal price might be falling but royalties get paid first.
In Tinkler’s words: “I have a very good working relationship with Noble.” He added that he had previously completed transactions in the $100 million to $200 million range “and I didn’t think a $20 million deal would be a problem”
From there a snowball started to head downhill, ending in the Mulsanne inquiry and Tinkler’s evidence, which could bring the investigation to an early end or trigger a fight over what seems to be Tinkler’s ever-diminishing fortune.
Perhaps the liquidator’s lawyers will prod, probe and question Tinkler’s evidence because that is what they are paid to do. Others will be inclined to do what Noble did and walk away with the impression that Tinkler was a man who took many business risks until his final deal was caught in the coal market collapse.
None of this is any comfort to the minority shareholders of Whitehaven because as Tinkler explains what went wrong in the Mulsanne/Blackwood deal, there is an uneasy feeling that similar forces may be at work in Tinkler Group’s stake in Whitehaven.
At yesterday’s closing price of $2.31, Whitehaven was a fraction off its 12-month share price low of $2.29 set in intra-day trading. That means the stock is roughly half its peak of last year, and Tinkler Group’s Whitehaven debt-funding arrangement could be more than $200 million ”underwater”
What Tinkler’s bankers think of that gap could be the next act in a process which started with the collapse of Mulsanne and appears to be heading directly for Whitehaven.
