An afternoon shift crew was conducting maintenance on the longwall, which had been on maintenance since the start of dayshift.
The bulk of the crew was conducting maintenance at the main gate, with one fitter working further in, about two-thirds of the way to the tailgate.
Midway through the shift, there was an air blast of sufficient force to knock the fitter over and be strongly felt by the crew at the main gate.
It was followed by a significant reversal of air.
The mine deputy proceeded to the tailgate where he found an open fire coming from the tailgate goaf.
He evacuated the unit and alerted the control room to evacuate the mine.
At the time of the incident there was a severe lightning storm.
The seam being worked contained significant amounts of methane and the mine had a sophisticated drainage system, with both pre-drainage and post-drainage in place.
The longwall panel was the first to be worked in the seam.
The seam being worked was overlain by a previously worked out seam.
An investigation into the cause of the ignition and the emergency response is continuing.
The investigation process has taken some time because of the complexity of issues under investigation.
Areas investigated include possible causes of the ignition, such as a lightning strike, spontaneous combustion, electrical ignition, mechanical heat sources, contraband and frictional ignition.
The NSW mines inspectorate recommended mine safety systems and procedures, environmental monitoring, ventilation systems and trigger action response plans should be kept up to date to prevent similar incidents occurring.
For emergency response preparation, it recommended training and competence of surface emergency personnel, use of emergency escape equipment and training of the workforce in the use of emergency equipment.
“It is recommended that mine operators review emergency management procedures and training, including the appropriate use of oxygen-generating emergency escape safety equipment,” it said in a safety alert.
Mine operators should also review the competence and training of surface emergency personnel, the adequacy of gas monitoring including alarm setting, calibration and trigger action response plans, the adequacy of mine lightning protection and the removal, isolation or earthing of possible conduction paths, the adequacy of engineering controls to prevent an ignition source and procedures to eliminate contraband entering underground workings.
It recommended mines review the need to inert goaf fringes to prevent a possible flammable mixture contacting ignition sources, such as frictional sparking.
The inspectorate stressed the importance of reminding managers, supervisors, other employees and contractors of their obligations under the Occupational Health and Safety Act 2000 and the Coal Mine Health and Safety Act 2002.