China’s climate change policies:

actors and drivers is based on 25 interviews with some of China’s key climate change policy-makers, experts and observers in early 2014.

It concedes that reading the tea leaves of Chinese climate change policy is difficult given the myriad actors and complex mix of drivers. There is, however, a philosophical and strategic interest in the issue.

“The messages about energy, environment, environmental degradation and industry restructuring are fused into the concept of ‘ecological civilisation’. The phrase refers to the Chinese leadership’s belief that an emissions and energy intensive economy is not sustainable in the long run... And it reflects the growing belief that economic gains must be balanced against environmental consequences,” notes the paper.

Its emissions trading scheme pilots cover 700 million tonnes of CO2, second only to the EU scheme at 2.1 billion tonnes. Many in China’s policy-making community believe that a national ETS, and potentially a carbon tax too, will be in place by 2020.

But climate change drivers are just part of the policy mix, along with issues such as energy security, support for strategic industries and urban smog.

“Until very recently, China’s energy intensity and renewable energy policies have been primarily driven by Chinese leaders’ anxieties about the country’s demand for energy. In fact, many of those interviewed for this paper said the 12th Five Year Plan carbon intensity target was directly derived from the energy intensity targets,” it says.

While this fear has eased, renewables and energy efficiency are seen as economic opportunities and solutions to air pollution, as expressed through the Air Pollution Prevention Action Plan released in September 2013.

The 13th Five Year Plan, covering 2015-20, is under development and will probably implement binding coal and energy consumption caps, part of its 2009 pledge to increase the contribution of non-fossil energy to 15% of the energy mix by 2020.

The government has already made a commitment to cut emissions per unit of GDP 40-45% from 2005 to 2020, but the paper says it is probably 5-10 years away from accepting binding carbon caps.

“China is losing confidence in the UNFCCC’s effectiveness, and may turn to regional solutions if the next round of negotiations in Paris in 2015 is not fruitful,” it adds.

China’s CO2 emissions are already more than a quarter of the world total. If its current policies remain unchanged, by 2020 its emissions will be more than double that of the second biggest emitter, the US.

As interesting as the policy insight is the glimpse into the opaque world of Chinese politics. The primary policy body is the National Leading Group for Addressing Climate Change, which is similar to a cabinet committee. It, and a related National Leading Group on Energy Saving and Pollution Reduction, is chaired by Premier Li Keqiang and including almost all ministers of the central government.

The National Development and Reform Commission is a ‘super ministry’ with primary responsibility for climate change governance. It vies with Ministry of Foreign Affairs (at Copenhagen summit), Ministry of Finance (which backs a tax over ETS) and increasingly the Ministry of Environmental Protection (over the air pollution agenda).

Provincial governments, which enjoy the same administrative rank as ministries, have substantial influence over policy development and primary responsibility for policy delivery and monitoring. The paper notes their “incentives are beginning to change as the problematic environmental outcomes of unrestrained economic development become more obvious, and as the central government puts more effort into its environmental and anti-corruption agendas”

Local government capacity is beginning to improve after concerted central government and international capacity-building efforts, although there is still a long way to go. A key question is whether the poorer west will follow the improvements of their eastern colleagues or whether environmental problems will merely be displaced as heavy industry and electricity generation migrate west.

State-owned enterprises are led by very senior members of the Communist Party of China, with leaders of the biggest SOEs have equal administrative rank to ministers and provincial governors, and direct lines of contact with the central and provincial leaders.

The extent of their influence is difficult to assess, but interviewees said it was significant and often favoured the status quo.

Academics and members of think tanks and research institutes “co-produce the Chinese climate change position and strategy” due to the lack of analytical capacity on climate change issues within the government. They are regularly called upon to provide independent advice to senior leaders.