Inspectors had power under Section 89 of the Occupational Health and Safety Act (OHSA) to have input into the emergency procedures at a site and into the coordinated emergency response, Regan told the NSW Minerals Council OH&S conference in the Hunter Valley.
“The impact of issuing a notice under section 89 of the OHSA from the perspective of mine management must be considered,” he said.
“Mine managers may not know the implication of the notice for their actions on site and whether the actions they want to take would breach the notice.
“A perception in industry that an investigation notice automatically leads to prosecution action may contribute to a manager’s uncertainty about how to deal with the notice.
“Inspectors should not feel constrained from issuing a notice just because a company official objects.”
The notice did not mean the mine inspector took responsibility for all actions on site, but did mean that site management and the inspector must establish a relationship to take into account the inspector’s opinion and powers when making a decision, Regan said. Also, the notice does not prevent rescue where possible.
He said mining emergencies demanded a coordinated response from a range of agencies, including the mine safety regulator. The ongoing rescue and recovery that could follow the initial emergency response exposed the inspector, like other responsible persons, to stressful circumstances for a long period.
Issuing a notice under section 89 of the OHSA in the early stages of emergency response to preserve evidence and provide a legislative basis for investigative actions established early control of the mine site.
“In an emergency situation, the basis for issuing this notice can established quickly, that is, the situation on site is not within normal operating parameters and needs controlling under emergency response procedures,” Regan said.
Notices under section 150 of the Coal Mine Health and Safety Act 2002 may also be issued to provide a formal basis for advice.
“Emergencies raise moral and ethical issues from having to make decisions about rescuing men trapped underground in dangerous conditions and dealing with the family members of these men,” Regan said.
“A number of guidelines and procedures to assist interagency cooperation during a mine emergency have been developed in cooperation with employers, NSW police, union representatives and the mine safety regulator.
“Interaction with New South Wales police is best handled by being familiar with the agreed procedure documents and referring to them at initial contact between police officers, inspectors and mine management.
“Any advice must not prevent an inspector validly exercising the duties and discretion as set out in the legislation. The two main issues confronting inspectors and mine management in an emergency are whether or not to send a rescue team underground and dealing with fatalities.”
“Decision paralysis” might be caused by the emotional response to the emergency hindering an ordered assessment of the circumstances.
Regan said if an inspector was confronted with refusal by mine management to mount a feasible and reasonable rescue, he should consider that paralysis in these circumstances was often the result of inability to assess risk or reluctance to accept risks arising from the decision.
“This can be addressed by using the company’s policies and procedures about risk assessment and control, emergency management systems, escape and rescue plans, fire fighting plans and withdrawal conditions in the decision-making process, provided these are adequate,” Regan said.
“The guidelines and protocols developed by the mining industry in New South Wales may be used effectively with the powers of mining inspectors to assist control and cooperation of emergency response at mines.”
