Massey Ruby

Just weeks after the loss of 29 miners at Upper Big Branch, Massey Energy marked its 30th death this year at the Ruby Energy operation in southern West Virginia.

Continuous miner operator James Erwin, 55, was working at the mine May 10 when he was struck by a shuttle car.

“While the shuttle car was leaving the No. 7 entry on the MMU 008-0 after the last car in the place was loaded, the victim was caught between the shuttle car and the coal rib,” a US Mine Safety and Health Administration spokesperson told ILN at the time.

After being transported to the surface of the mine, which is operated by Massey subsidiary Spartan Mining, Erwin was air-lifted to a nearby medical center. He succumbed to his injuries at 6am local time May 21.

The miner was a 35-year industry veteran and had worked at Ruby Energy for seven years. It was the mine’s first fatality since 2004, according to federal records.

MSHA classified the incident as Powered Haulage when it released a fatalgram in early June, highlighting the importance of good communication between workers and reminding all miners to make visual checks to ensure clear travel and to sound warning devices before operating mobile equipment underground. Investigators also stressed the use of reflective clothing to aid visibility when working near mobile units and the benefits of installing translucent ventilation curtains.

MSHA cited Massey in October when it released the findings of its investigation.

While investigators did note that Ruby’s roof control plan was approved in December 2008, Massey had failed to adequately implement the plan, which was designed to ensure miners did not position themselves in dangerous pinch hazard areas.

“The general safety precautions of the roof control plan in effect at the time of the accident, page 5, item 18, required that ‘the continuous miner shall be operated from a sufficient distance while in the remote mode so as the miner operator will not be endangered by the continuous miner or shuttle car. The operator is not permitted to set the remote control unit on the continuous miner and operate it in this manner’,” MSHA said.

“The accident occurred because the continuous mining machine operator was positioned in a dangerous location within the outside turn radius of the shuttle car as it left the entry.

“The shuttle car operator's vision was restricted by the loaded material on the shuttle car and the turning angle of the car, preventing him from observing the mining machine operator.”

To rectify the issues at the mine, MSHA ordered the operator to upgrade its roof control plan to include stronger precautions for miners working near mobile equipment.

The revision requires that shuttle car operators now “assure that no one is along side of the shuttle car in the turning radius prior to making the turn into or out of an entry".

In addition, while the mine’s staff had been trained previously on pinch point hazards, all personnel were retrained to reinforce their understanding of mobile equipment operation hazards. That retraining focused on pinch points and revised safety precautions of the roof control plan.

Massey was given a 104(a) citation in relation to the incident for a violation of 30 CFR Section 75.220(a)(1) for failure to comply with the approved roof control plan.

The room and pillar Ruby operation in Mingo County extracts from the No. 2 Gas coal seam with a staff of 83. It produced an average of 2400 tons daily from two continuous miner sections at the time of the incident.

Ruby’s non-fatal days lost injury incidence rate in 2009 was 3.87, versus the national average of 4.23.

Choctaw

A surface fatality, one of six recorded to date in 2010, on June 8 at Taft Coal Sales and Associates’ Choctaw operation in Alabama marked the 37th US coal death.

Federal regulators confirmed that 38-year-old service truck operator Phillip Gustafson died after being engulfed in flames as the result of an ignition/explosion event while fueling a blasthole drill rig.

Gustafson’s seven-and-a-half years of experience were all at Choctaw, conducting his primary duties.

While a final investigative report from MSHA is still pending, regulators did release a collection of best practices for mines to prevent similar events. Included in those recommendations are regular checks of hydraulic lines and connections, especially those near hot surfaces, before operating a vehicle.

Miners should also use car and open fuel tanks slowly to relieve any pressure build-up and ensure a well-ventilated refueling area, particularly in low areas. Before refueling, operators should turn off engines and motors to eliminate other potential ignition sources.

The 105-worker Choctaw bituminous mine is owned by large Alabama producer Walter Energy.

Clover Fork

Just a few days after the Choctaw fatality, a Kentucky section foreman was killed after being hit by a falling steel beam underground.

Jim Carmack, 42, was installing rib support at Lone Mountain Processing’s Clover Fork No. 1 operation when a rib/roof fall occurred.

“A section of the rib measuring 12 feet wide, 15 feet 6 inches high, and 9 feet thick struck and dislodged a large Heintzmann roof jack, causing the jack to strike the victim,” MSHA said just after the accident.

Carmack, who had 17 years of mining experience, was working with a crew on retreat mining in the 15-16ft high section.

A Kentucky Office of Mine Safety and Licensing spokesperson told ILN shortly after the June 16 incident that its database showed 16 reportable accidents at the mine between June 16, 2005, and that week.

However, no incidents in the past five years had been recorded as “serious” or “fatal”

Mine owner Arch Coal did not release any public statement on the Clover Fork fatality.

According to MSHA statistics, three NFDL operator injuries were reported for the Harlan County operation in 2009, when crews worked 297,986 man hours to produce just over 849,000 tons.

Adherence to an approved roof control plan was the focus of a late June fatalgram released by MSHA investigators as a result of their preliminary findings.

Federal officials recommended that all US operations conduct roof evaluations when entering a previously mined area for the purpose of pillar recovery. Additionally, loose ribs or roof should be supported adequately or the material scaled down before commencing work.

Prevention of similar incidents could be further ensured by conducting thorough pre-shift and on-shift examinations of the roof, face and ribs immediately before work or travel in an area and thereafter as conditions warranted.

“Know and follow the approved roof control plan,” the agency stressed.

“Take additional measures to protect persons if unusual hazards are encountered.”

Roof control plans should also be suitable for prevailing geologic

conditions. Should conditions change or the support system become inadequate for roof, face or rib control, the operation must revise its plan.

Finally, all workers should be alert to changing geological conditions which may affect roof, rib and face conditions.

A final report regarding Carmack’s death was still pending at press time.

Leeco No. 68

Before June came to a close, another Kentucky worker lost his life in a crushing accident underground, again highlighting the need for proximity detection systems for all US mines.

Continuous miner operator Bobby Smith, 29, of Perry County was working at Leeco’s Mine No. 68 on the afternoon of June 24 when he was caught between the right rib and the remote-control continuous miner he was operating.

The 12-year mining veteran was the fifth Kentucky coal miner to die in 2010 and the 39th for the nation’s coal industry.

In a fatalgram released a few weeks after the incident, MSHA urged operators once again to install federally approved proximity detection systems on continuous mining machines.

The agency’s web site has information on the latest technology, research and available systems: http://www.msha.gov/Accident_Prevention/NewTechnologies/ProximityDetection/ProximitydetectionSingleSource.asp.

Federal regulators also encourage operations to avoid red zone areas associated with remote CM machines and other mobile equipment. Further information and training resources are also available at the agency website at http://www.msha.gov/webcasts/coal2004/REDZONE2.pdf.

Other ways to help avoid incidents such as the one that killed Smith, according to MSHA, include ensuring equipment is being operated safely, especially in low mining heights or in slippery and uneven floor conditions.

Workers should also maintain equipment in safe operating condition and always observe work practices, providing feedback to management in a timely manner.

A final investigation report is still pending on the Leeco incident.

Keep reading ILN for the next part of our review on US coal fatalities in 2010.